Privacy-Preserving Regressionon Partially Encrypted Data

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Abstract: There is a growing interest in leveraging the computational resources and storage capacities of remote compute and storage infrastructures for data analysis. However, the loss of control over the data raises concerns about data privacy. In order to remedy these concerns, data can be encrypted before transmission to the remote infrastructure, but the use of encryption renders data analysis a challenging task. An important observation is that it suffices to encrypt only certain parts of the data in various real-world scenarios, which makes it possible to devise efficient algorithms for secure remote data analysis based on partially homomorphic encryption. We present several computationally efficient algorithms for regression analysis, focusing on linear regression, that work with partially encrypted data. Our evaluation shows that we can both train models and compute predictions with these models quickly enough for practical use. At the expense of full data confidentiality, our algorithms outperform state-of-the-art schemes based on fully homomorphic encryption or multi-party computation by several orders of magnitude.

1 Introduction

There is a strong trend towards outsourcing both storage and computation to remote infrastructures, e.g., cloud providers, in various industries. This trend is driven by the facts that more and more data with a large potential business value is being captured and the cloud providers offer a convenient and cost-effective solution for the archival and processing of large volumes of data. Of course, machine learning plays a major role in the analysis of this data. A fundamental application of data analysis is prediction and forecasting, which is the focus of this work. More precisely, we study the problem of outsourcing regression analysis. We distinguish between two different tasks in regression analysis: In the training phase, we use input data (*independent variables*) together with known output data (*dependent variable*) to train a model. Afterwards, the model can be used to predict output data for new input data, i.e., for input data for which the output is unknown.

While outsourcing regression analysis provides great benefits, many companies are reluctant or unwilling to share business-relevant data, let alone provide access to a (third-party) cloud provider. Obviously, simply encrypting the data using standard encryption before shipping it off to the remote infrastructure does not solve the problem because the encryption would prevent the provider from running meaningful computation on the data. Handing over the encryption keys is also not a satisfactory solution because the data must be decrypted before any operation is carried out. More importantly, this solution requires trust in the provider not to abuse its knowledge of the key. In this case, the security level increases marginally compared to fully trusting the provider and sending data out in plaintext over encrypted channels. Thus, a significant challenge is to overcome the security concerns due to the loss of control over data when it is transferred to a remote infrastructure operated by another party. This problem has received considerable attention in the last couple of years and various solutions have been proposed, based on either multiple providers that are assumed to faithfully execute the protocols (*secure multi-party computation*), or *fully homomorphic encryption* (FHE) [9]. The drawback of the first approach is that it relies on the assumption that the providers do not collude and the latter suffers from an impractically large computational overhead.

We propose a new approach to do regression in untrusted remote infrastructures that does not depend on a non-collusion assumption and is several orders of magnitude faster than existing solutions based on FHE. The key insight is that not all data necessarily needs to be encrypted in many practical scenarios, and this fact can be exploited to build efficient regression algorithms based on *partially homomorphic encryption*.

In this paper, two different regression scenarios are considered, each keeping a different part of the data unencrypted. In the first scenario, we use *independent variables in plaintext* and encrypted dependent variables to train an encrypted model, based on



Figure 1: Devices send data to the remote service provider (server S) for storage and processing. The beneficiary, which resides on the client side, receives the processing results, either periodically or upon issuing a specific query.

the algorithm provided by the client, that can be used to compute encrypted dependent variables. Thus, in this scenario, the provider learns what independent variables are used to build the model but the provider cannot make sense of the computed model, nor can the provider learn anything about the computed dependent variables. This scenario has a wide range of practical applications. For example, public wind and weather data (plain text independent variables) can be used to predict operational points of wind farms and solar plants (encrypted dependent variables), or electricity consumption can be used to predict prices on the electricity market (or the other way round). Other examples are the use of social media data for sentiment analysis and current pricing information for stock market prediction.

Of course, there are just as many applications where both independent and dependent variables are confidential. In this case, we propose to *keep the model in plaintext*, and use the encrypted confidential data (both independent and dependent variables are encrypted) to train this model. The model can then be used to compute encrypted dependent variables. The provider cannot deduce anything about the computed dependent variables since they are encrypted with the client's key to which the provider has no access.

The **contributions** of this work are the following. We propose approaches to perform regression analysis in a privacy-preserving manner where data and model are partially encrypted and only one server is needed (i.e., a non-collusion assumption is not necessary). An additively homomorphic encryption scheme is sufficient to implement these approaches. To illustrate our mechanisms, we use linear regression and provide a comparative evaluation using both real-world and synthetic data sets. The evaluation shows that our mechanisms are fast enough for many practical use cases by computing a model in the order of seconds and predictions in the order of milliseconds. Furthermore, the evaluation reveals that our approach is considerably faster than any state-of-the-art implementation based on two-server solutions or FHE: we can achieve a speed-up of 4 orders of magnitude or more. Thus, tremendous performance gains are feasible when sacrificing full data privacy preservation by encrypting only the most crucial parts of the data.

The paper is structured as follows. Our model is explained in detail in §2. Our mechanisms are presented and evaluated in §3 and §4, respectively. Related work on privacy-preserving machine learning and regression in particular is summarized in §5. Finally, §6 concludes the paper.

2 Model

In an industrial setting, there are three parties involved in machine learning tasks: the *devices* generating the data, the *service provider* carrying out demanding computations and the *beneficiaries* receiving the results of the computations. Our model of this setting is depicted in Figure 1. For simplicity, we consider the parties providing the data and requiring the results as one party, i.e., devices and beneficiary are merged in a client role C. We assume that all clients subsumed in client C belong to the same trust domain, i.e., they are allowed to learn the same information in any processing task. The service provider, on the other hand, remains a separate untrusted party denoted by S. S is assumed to be *honest-but-curious*, i.e., it follows the protocol and does not attempt disruptions or fraud. Moreover, we assume that S cannot break the used cryptographic schemes for keys of reasonable length.

Typically, the devices are equipped with resource-constrained hardware, both in terms of computational power and storage, while the beneficiaries have more computational resources, e.g., in the form of a powerful computer, and the service provider has significantly more computational resources and storage capacity in the form of a computer cluster or a data center. Therefore, the data produced at the client C must be transferred to and stored at the service provider S. In addition, as much computational load as possible must be shifted from C to S. In particular, we consider two tasks, which must be executed primarily by S, a training task and a prediction task.

The *training task* consists of fitting a model to data according to a function f. The data consists of m samples, where each sample i contains a vector $x^{(i)}$ of n features—the *independent variables*—and a scalar $y^{(i)}$, which constitutes the *dependent variable*. Let X and y denote the matrix and the vector of all independent and dependent variables, respectively. The model computed in the training task is $\theta = f(X, y)$.

The *prediction task* uses the model θ, computed from known X and y, to predict the dependent vari-

able for new independent variables. More formally, a *prediction* is computed through some function g based on the vector x of independent variables and the model θ: $y = g(x, \theta)$. In this paper, we focus on functions f and g that can be approximated by a bounded-degree polynomial.

In order to ensure that the untrusted provider S learns as little as possible during the course of the computation, data is *encrypted* before being transmitted to S. Note that there are fundamentally different approaches such as obfuscating data, e.g., by adding noise according to some predefined distribution. We assume that the unaltered data must be stored in the database, which prohibits the use of such schemes. This situation occurs quite naturally when the remote infrastructure is also used as a data archive, which may be a regulatory necessity. When using asymmetric cryptography, only the beneficiary C needs access to the secret key whereas the data generating devices solely use the public key for encryption. Our algorithms require that the encryption scheme be *additively homomorphic*, i.e., sums can be computed on encrypted values directly without access to the (decryption) key. Formally, let $[v]_k$ denote the cipher text corresponding to the plaintext value v encrypted with key k. An encryption scheme is called additively homomorphic if there is an operator $\oplus$ such that $[v_1]_k \oplus [v_2]_k$ is an encryption of $v_1 + v_2$ for any key k and values v_1 and v_2.[1] Since it is always clear from the context which key is used, we omit the index and simply write $[v]$. In addition, we require homomorphic multiplication of an encrypted number with a plaintext factor, resulting in an encryption of the product of the encrypted number and the factor. Several additively homomorphic encryption schemes support this operation. For ease of exposition, we use homomorphic operators implicitly whenever at least one operand is encrypted, e.g., $[v_1] + [v_2]$ and $v_1[v_2]$ denote the homomorphic addition (where both terms are encrypted) and multiplication (where one of the terms is encrypted), respectively.

Our algorithms to train a model and predict dependent variables are based on the exchange of plaintext and ciphertext messages between S and C and local computation at the two parties. The primary complexity measure of an algorithm is the *computational complexity*, which is the number of basic mathematical operations, either on plaintext or on ciphertext, that need to be carried out. As mentioned earlier, the goal is to minimize the effort of C. Additionally, we discuss how many encrypted and plaintext values must be exchanged during the execution of the algorithm.

[1] Note that there may be many valid ciphertexts (encrypted values) corresponding to the same plaintext value so we cannot assume that $[v_1]_k \oplus [v_2]_k = [v_1 + v_2]_k$.

3 Privacy-Preserving Linear Regression

3.1 Basic Concepts

Linear regression is a method to compute a model θ representing a best-fit linear relation between $x^{(i)}$ and $y^{(i)}$, i.e., we get that $x^{(i)} \cdot \theta = y^{(i)} + e^{(i)}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, where $e^{(i)}$ are error terms. More precisely, θ should minimize the cost function $J(\theta) := \frac{1}{2m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} (x^{(i)} \cdot \theta - y^{(i)})^2$. The model θ can then be used to predict y for vectors x that are obtained later by computing $x \cdot \theta$.

There are two commonly used approaches to compute θ in such a way that the cost function $J(\theta)$ is minimized. The first approach solves the *normal equation* $\theta = (X^T X)^{-1} X^T y$, the second one uses gradient descent. In the gradient descent-based approach, θ is updated iteratively, using the derivative of $J(\theta)$, until $J(\theta)$ converges to a small value as follows:

$$\theta_j := \theta_j - \alpha \frac{\partial J}{\partial \theta_j} = \theta_j - \alpha \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} (x^{(i)} \cdot \theta - y^{(i)}) x_j^{(i)} \tag{1}$$

The parameter α influences the rate of convergence. The approach with normal equation requires the inversion of an $n \times n$-matrix. Therefore, gradient descent can be significantly faster when the number of features is large.

For gradient descent to work well, features should have a similar scale. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that numerical values in the data are *normalized*, i.e., the mean is shifted to 0 and all values are scaled to be in the range $[-1, 1]$. We further assume that the mean μ or at least an approximate bound is known. Given (the approximation of) μ, the devices can easily perform this normalization by setting $x_i \leftarrow \frac{x_i - \mu}{\max\{x_{\max} - \mu, \mu - x_{\min}\}}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots m\}$.

This feature scaling and fractional numbers in general pose a problem when working with encrypted data as most encryption schemes operate on integers in a finite field. We address this problem by transforming the values into fixed-point numbers before they are encrypted and processed. To this end, we introduce an approximation step, where each value is multiplied with a large factor and then rounded to the closest integer, before encrypting the data. The magnitude of the factor has an impact on the achievable precision, as we will discuss in more detail in §4. Formally, we write

$$\hat{x} := \texttt{approximate}(x, \lambda),$$

where x is the independent variable, λ is the factor that is multiplied with x, and $\hat{x}$ is the rounded result. This subroutine `approximate` can naturally be extended to take a vector or matrix as input by applying the subroutine to each scalar in the vector or matrix. We will use this extended definition of the subroutine in our algorithms. The loss in precision becomes negligible when λ is large enough. Formally, if $c = f(a, b)$ for some function f, we write $\hat{c} \simeq f(\hat{a}, \hat{b})$. In other words, we almost get the same result when applying the subroutine to the result of a computation as when carrying out the computation with approximated inputs. We further write $\hat{c} \simeq \lambda c$, which states that $\hat{c}$ is λ times larger up to rounding.

As mentioned before, we consider encryption schemes that support homomorphic multiplication of encrypted values with plaintext values. Again, such a multiplication is only possible with plaintext integers but our mechanisms require the capability to multiply encrypted values with arbitrary rational numbers. There are two options to provide this operation. The first option entails a loss of precision by converting the factor into a fixed-point number using again the approximation subroutine. The second option is to involve the client in the computation by asking it to decrypt the value, carry out the multiplication, round the result to the nearest integer, and send the encrypted result back to S. We use both options in our algorithms, carefully selecting between them to minimize the precision loss and the communication and computational load on the client.

3.2 Algorithms

All our proposed algorithms allow the client C to preprocess each sample separately. In other words, the algorithms can be used in environments with multiple data sources, without requiring them to communicate with each other. Some of our algorithms involve C in the computation as outlined in the previous section.

As discussed in §1, we consider two different scenarios, each scenario encrypting a different set of parameters.

1) **Encrypted** $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$: The matrix of independent variables X is provided in plain text whereas the model θ and the vector of dependent variables y are encrypted.
2) **Encrypted** $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$: Both the matrix of independent variables X and the vector of dependent variables y are encrypted but the model θ is in plaintext.

For Scenario 1), we propose three methods to compute θ in encrypted form: The first one uses gradient descent and is thus particularly useful for scenarios where X contains many features. The second method solves the normal equation, and the third method requires the client to do some preprocessing of the data in order to speed up the computation on the server. After discussing these methods, we present an algorithm for Scenario 2) based on gradient descent.



Figure 2: Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ using gradient descent.

3.2.1 Encrypted $\theta\&y$ Using Gradient Descent

Initially, C sends the independent variable matrix X in plaintext and the corresponding dependent variable vector y in encrypted approximate form ($[\hat{y}]$) to S. Thus, C sends mn plaintext values and m encrypted values. S then applies Equation (1) iteratively on the data. To this end, S performs the approximation for $X^T X$ and X^T:

$$M := \texttt{approximate}(X^T X, \lambda)$$
$$T := \texttt{approximate}(X^T, \lambda)$$

Subsequently, S computes $[r_1] := M[\theta_0] - T[\hat{y}]$, where the initial model θ_0 is set to a suitable starting vector in encrypted form. In the next step, S sends $[r_1]$ to the client, which decrypts it, applies the multiplication with α/m and sends back the result. This operation is assigned to the client since α/m is a number close to zero if there are many samples, and thus the precision loss by carrying out this multiplication on S can be significant. These two steps are repeated K times (or until the client decides that the value is small enough). This scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.

It is easy to see that the model is updated according to Equation (1). In each iteration, $2n$ ciphertext values are transmitted from S to C and back. Thus, $O(Kn)$ ciphertexts are exchanged during gradient descent. Overall, S must perform $O(Kmn)$ homomorphic operations and $O(Kn)$ operations on plaintext, whereas C carries out $O(Kn)$ plaintext, encryption, and decryption operations.

3.2.2 Encrypted $\theta\&y$ Using Normal Equation

The second approach solves the normal equation on S directly. In this case, no interaction with the client

Algorithm 1: TRAINING: Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ using normal equation.

Input: X, $[\![\hat{y}]\!]$, λ
Output: $[\![\theta]\!]$
1 $A := \texttt{approximate}((X^T X)^{-1} X^T, \lambda)$
2 $[\![\theta]\!] := A[\![\hat{y}]\!]$
3 **return** $[\![\theta]\!]$

is necessary after receiving X and $[\![\hat{y}]\!]$.

Given X and λ, S first computes $(X^T X)^{-1} X^T$ and applies the subroutine `approximate`. S can then use this matrix together with $[\![\hat{y}]\!]$ to compute $[\![\theta]\!]$, see Algorithm 1. This computation is obviously correct in principle but there is a loss in precision due to the approximation.

Overall, $O(mn^2 + n^{2.373})$ plaintext operations are performed to compute A. The second term is the complexity of inverting $X^T X$ for optimized variants of the Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [6, 18, 25]. For problems with a large number of features, the inversion can be computed by other methods, e.g., with LU decompositions. In addition, $O(nm)$ homomorphic operations (additions of ciphertexts and multiplications of ciphertexts with plaintext values) are needed to compute $[\![\theta]\!]$. If n is relatively small, e.g., 1000 or less, the homomorphic operations are likely to dominate the computational complexity as they are typically several orders of magnitude slower than equivalent operations in the plaintext domain. A detailed analysis is given in §4.

3.2.3 Encrypted $\theta\&y$ with Preprocessing

The third approach is also based on solving the normal equation but reduces the number of homomorphic operations on S for the case when the number of samples m is greater than the number of features n. This reduction is achieved by preprocessing the data on the client side as follows. As before, C sends the matrix X to S. However, instead of sending $[\![\hat{y}]\!]$, C computes $b_i := {X^{(i)}}^T y^{(i)}$, where $X^{(i)}$ denotes the i^{th} row of X, and transmits $[\![\hat{b_i}]\!]$ for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$.

The server S then computes

$$A := \texttt{approximate}((X^T X)^{-1}, \lambda).$$

Next, it sums up the vectors $[\![\hat{b_i}]\!]$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ homomorphically, which yields the encrypted vector $[\![\hat{b}]\!]$, where $b = X^T y$. Finally, θ is computed by multiplying A and $[\![\hat{b}]\!]$ homomorphically. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.

The homomorphism with respect to addition implies that

$$\hat{b} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{b}_i \simeq \sum_{i=1}^{m} {X^{(i)}}^T \hat{y}^{(i)} = X^T \hat{y}.$$

Algorithm 2: TRAINING: Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ with preprocessing.

Input: X, λ, $\{[\![\hat{b}_1]\!], \ldots, [\![\hat{b}_m]\!]\}$
$(b_i = {X^{(i)}}^T y^{(i)})$
Output: $[\![\theta]\!]$
1 $A := \texttt{approximate}((X^T X)^{-1}, \lambda)$
2 $[\![\hat{b}]\!] := \sum_{i=1}^{m} [\![\hat{b}_i]\!]$
3 $[\![\theta]\!] := A[\![\hat{b}]\!]$
4 **return** $[\![\theta]\!]$

Thus, Algorithm 2 solves the (approximate) normal equation for θ correctly by multiplying A and $[\![\hat{b}]\!]$. If $m > n$, the advantage of Algorithm 2 as opposed to Algorithm 1 is that the number of homomorphic multiplications on S is reduced from $O(nm)$ to $O(n^2)$. Conversely, C must perform $O(mn)$ additional operations to compute the vectors $[\![\hat{b}_1]\!], \ldots, [\![\hat{b}_m]\!]$. In addition to transmitting the plaintext matrix X, C also sends these m n-dimensional vectors, i.e., $O(mn)$ values are sent in total.

Since each vector $[\hat{bi}]$ is sent individually, using the algorithm in a setting with multiple clients is straightforward. If there is only one client that holds X and y locally, the algorithm can be optimized: The client computes $b = X^T y$ directly and sends $[\![\hat{b}]\!]$ to S. In this case, the client must only encrypt $\hat{b}$, i.e., n values in total, in contrast to encrypting all vectors $\hat{b}_i$, which requires the encryption of nm values. Moreover, S would not have to compute $[\![\hat{b}]\!]$.

3.2.4 Encrypted $X\&y$ Using Gradient Descent

We now consider the scenario where X and y are encrypted and the model θ is computed in plaintext. Solving the normal equation directly involves the multiplication of elements of X and y, which is not possible using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Gradient descent cannot be used directly either because X^T must be multiplied with terms containing X and y. However, it is possible to use gradient descent when the client performs some preprocessing on the data: For each sample i, the client prepares a vector $[\hat{b}_i]$, where $b_i = {X^{(i)}}^T y^{(i)}$, and matrix $[\hat{A}_i]$, where $A_i = {X^{(i)}}^T X^{(i)}$, and transmits them to S.



Figure 3: Encrypted $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$ using gradient descent.

As in §3.2.1, the initial model θ_0 is set to a suitable starting vector. In order to support values smaller than 1 in the model, θ_0 is scaled by λ. S sums up all received encrypted vectors $[\hat{b}_i]$ and multiplies the sum with λ homomorphically, resulting in the encrypted vector $[\hat{b}]$. The encrypted matrices $[\hat{A}_i]$ are also summed up homomorphically, which yields the encrypted matrix $[\hat{A}]$. Vector $[\hat{b}]$ and matrix $[\hat{A}]$ are used in each iteration i as follows: S sends $[r_i] := [\hat{A}]\theta_{i-1} - [\hat{b}]$ to C, where it is decrypted and multiplied with α/m before being converted again to an integer using the subroutine `approximate`. The result $\hat{d}_i$ is sent back to S. The updated model θ_i is computed by subtracting $\hat{d}_i$ from θ_{i-1}. The algorithm is depicted in Figure 3.

Again, due to the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, we have that

$$\hat{A} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{A}_i \simeq \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{m} A_i = \lambda X^T X \tag{2}$$

$$\hat{b} = \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{m} \hat{b}_i \simeq \lambda^2 \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i = \lambda^2 X^T y, \tag{3}$$

and thus

$$r'_i \simeq \frac{1}{\lambda^2} r_i = \frac{1}{\lambda^2}(\hat{A}\theta_{i-1} - \hat{b})$$
$$\overset{(2),(3)}{\simeq} X^T X \theta_{i-1} - X^T y,$$

where r'_i denotes the correct difference between the two terms on the right-hand side. Hence, the algorithm implements gradient descent correctly.

As far as the computational complexity is concerned, S carries out $O(mn^2 + Kn^2)$ homomorphic additions and $O(Kn^2)$ homomorphic multiplications. At the beginning, the client sends $m(n^2 + n)$ encrypted values. n encrypted values are exchanged in each iteration. C has to decrypt them, carry out a multiplication and convert them to integers before sending them back to S. Thus, $O(mn^2 + Kn)$ values are exchanged in total. Note that S learns not only the final model but also all intermediate models. It depends on the use case whether this information leakage is acceptable. In other words, depending on the data, S may or may not be able to extract information from these models. In either case, it cannot directly use them as they produce encrypted predictions.

3.2.5 Prediction

Having computed the model, the second fundamental task is to predict y given a new input vector x. In Scenario 1), x is not encrypted, so S can get the encrypted prediction by computing $[y] = x[\theta]$. Likewise, in Scenario 2), the model θ is not encrypted, therefore S can compute $[y] = [x]\theta$. In both scenarios, S needs $O(n)$ homomorphic operations to compute a prediction.

3.3 Scalability

After having introduced the basic methods of our approach, we now describe optimizations, for both the client and the server.

3.3.1 Packing

While most computational work is offloaded to the server, the client is required to carry out many encryption and decryption operations in all proposed algorithms. Since decryption is the most expensive operation, we will now discuss how we reduce the number of decryption operations at the client using a technique called *packing* [2, 8, 19]. The server S packs multiple ciphertexts that must be sent to the client into a single ciphertext by repeatedly shifting and adding them, which can be done without knowledge of the decryption key. However, S must know how many bits are used to encode a single plaintext. The client can then recover the plaintexts by decrypting the ciphertext and extracting each individual plaintext by shifting and applying a bit mask. For example, for a key size of 2048 bit and 32-bit plaintexts, up to 64 ciphertexts can be packed, reducing the number of decryptions by the same factor. This feature is used in both gradient-descent based algorithms, where S sends the encrypted vector $[r_i]$ in each iteration.

3.3.2 Iterative Model Computation

In many application scenarios, the client sends a stream of samples to the server, which in turn is supposed to update the computed model accordingly []. Our approaches can be adapted easily to accommodate such requirements. E.g., the gradient-descent based algorithm for Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ can be modified as follows: instead of sending X and $[\hat{y}]$, the client

sends $x^{(i)}$ and $\left[\hat{y}^{(i)}\right]$ separately for each i. The server then updates M and T based on the new values (a fast operation since X is not encrypted), computes $\left[r_i\right]$, and sends it back to the client. The client computes $\left[d_i\right]$ and returns it to the server, possibly together with the next sample. Similarly, in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 the matrix A and vector $\left[\hat{b}\right]$ can be updated efficiently after receiving each sample. This also holds for Encrypted $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$, where $\left[\hat{A}\right]$, $\left[\hat{b}\right]$ and $\left[r_i\right]$ can be computed efficiently for each new sample.

Depending on the application, it might also make sense for the client to send samples in batches; the iterative approach outlined above can be adapted for batched samples as well. The computation complexity on the server can be reduced using optimization methods decreasing the frequency with which a new model is computed [24] or a recursive approach that assigns more weight to recent samples [12]. In our evaluation, we investigate the performance of our methods without such optimizations to gain an understanding of their basic behavior in different scenarios.

4 Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the different linear regression methods experimentally. We describe the experimental setup and present results on precision and running times.

4.1 Experimental Setup

We use several data sets with different numbers of samples and features to evaluate the performance.

Real-world data sets: In order to enable other researchers to compare their methods to ours, we have chosen 8 publicly available data sets.[2] In this paper, we focus primarily on two representative data sets: Set 1 contains data from a *Combined Cycle Power Plant* (CCPP) with 9568 samples and 4 features. Set 2 is called *Condition Based Monitoring* (CBM) with 11,934 samples and 17 features. A summary of our results for the other 6 data sets is provided as well. Furthermore, we also generate synthetic data to analyze the impact of the number of samples and features on the computational complexity.

Synthetic data sets: We generated synthetic data sets with 10 to 80 features and 1000 to 64'000 samples, where the elements of X are floating point values chosen uniformly at random between 0 and 1 and y is computed for a model vector θ with randomly chosen floating point numbers and some noise.

We use the additively homomorphic Paillier encryption scheme [20] in our implementation, which supports the required homomorphic operations. In this encryption scheme, a homomorphic addition corresponds to a multiplication (of ciphertexts), while a homomorphic multiplication corresponds to an exponentiation, where the plaintext factor is the exponent. All homomorphic operations are carried out modulo a large number. The most expensive operations, encryption and decryption, have been optimized using standard tricks such as precomputing random factors and working in a subgroup generated by an element of order αn [15].

We implemented our algorithms in C++ using the library NTL[3] and used 2048-bit encryption keys, corresponding to a 112-bit security level [4].

For comparison, we implemented the gradient descent and matrix inversion methods for unencrypted data using the Armadillo library[4]. We ran the tests on a computer with an Intel Core i5-2400 CPU at 3.1 GHz and 24GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04.

4.2 Precision

We normalized the data in the data sets as described in §3.1. The number of bits used to represent real values as fixed-point integers is a compromise between precision and overhead in storage and computation time. In order to better understand this trade-off, we measured the precision error, defined as the Euclidean norm of the difference between θ obtained with approximated values and θ obtained with arbitrary precision floating point values, using different numbers of bits for the approximation. The precision error when computing with 64-bit floating point numbers is in the order of 10^{-71} for CBM and 10^{-72} for CCPP. We found that this level of precision can be matched using 50 bits for the approximation. Since measurements themselves contain errors, such a high precision is typically not necessary. Therefore, we decided to use 30 bits, which corresponds to precision errors in the order of less than 10^{-35}. Note that 20 bits are used in relevant related work [11, 19].

4.3 Time

We present results for the time needed to compute the model and make predictions as averages over 100 runs. First, we analyze the performance of our algorithms on real-world data sets. Afterwards, we study how the two main parameters—the number of samples and features in the data set—affect performance using randomly generated data.

[2] See https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/.

[3] See http://www.shoup.net/ntl/.

[4] See http://arma.sourceforge.net/.

Training	plaintext, gradient descent, K=10	plaintext, normal equation
Server training total [ms]	11 (24)	0.15 (1.4)

Table 1: Running times for computing the model without encryption. The first number is for the CCPP data set and the second one in parentheses for the CBM data set.

Training	Encrypted θ&$\mathbf{y}$ gradient descent K=10	Encrypted θ&$\mathbf{y}$ normal equation	Encrypted θ&$\mathbf{y}$ preprocessing	Encrypted $\mathbf{X}$&$\mathbf{y}$ gradient descent K=10
Client prep./sample [ms]	1.16 (1.98)	1.14 (1.99)	5.02 (17.731)	26.23 (106.23)
Client training/iter. [ms]	9.05 (20.11)	-	-	118.23 (143.91)
Server training/iter. [ms]	187.55 (949.24)	-	-	411.30 (3713.22)
Server training total [ms]	1966.01 (9693.32)	1553.66 (8748.05)	116.42 (571.23)	5550.35 (38314.80)
Server overhead	179 (404)	10,371 (6,249)	799 (408)	3,483 (1583)

Table 2: Running times and overhead factors for computing the model with Paillier encryption. The first number is for the CCPP data set and the second one in parentheses for the CBM data set.

4.3.1 Analysis Using Real-World Data Sets

The times for computing the model (training task) without encryption and with encryption are given in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. Each method from §3.2 is presented in a separate column, gradient descent was performed for K=10 iterations. The rows indicate the following: "Client preparation per sample" shows the time the client needs to preprocess and encrypt a single sample, whereas "Client training per iteration" shows how much time is spent at the client to compute the update to the model in each gradient descent iteration. "Server training per iteration" shows the time spent at the server for a single gradient descent iteration, and "Server training total" shows the total time needed by the server. This total time includes the time spent at the client when performing operations on behalf of the server in each gradient descent iteration. However, the "Client per sample" time is excluded as it is dominated by the time to encrypt samples, which we do not consider a part of computing the model. "Server overhead" shows the overhead factor, which is the ratio between the "Server training total" times in Table 2 and Table 1.

The time for predictions is shown in Table 3. For the scenario when X and y are encrypted, it comprises the time for encryption at the client and the time for computing the prediction on the server. Recall that we always use 30 bits to encode input values as fixed-point numbers. It is important to understand how the encoding affects performance. Figure 4 depicts the dependence of the time required to make a prediction on the number of bits used for the approximation.

As mentioned before, we also ran our algorithms on six other data sets. Since these experiments did not yield substantially different results, we omit a detailed analysis and present a short summary in Table 4 and Table 5. The table contains the number of features and samples for each data set. Moreover, it shows the server overhead for each of the four proposed algorithms when training the model and the server overhead to compute predictions for both considered scenarios (encrypting θ and y or X and y).



Figure 4: Running time to compute one prediction for different numbers of bits used to approximate real numbers.

4.3.2 Analysis Using Synthetic Data Sets

Since all cryptographic operations (encryption, decryption, and homomorphic operations) take roughly the same amount of time independent of the actual data values, the performance depends primarily on a) the chosen algorithm and b) the number of features

Prediction	Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$	Encrypted $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$	plain text
Client [ms]	0.523 (0.525)	4.631 (4.678)	-
Server [ms]	0.244 (0.934)	0.347 (0.376)	0.000224 (0.0000711)
Server overhead [$\times 10^4$]	3.440 (4.176)	5.291 (1.552)	-

Table 3: Running times and overhead factors for predictions. The first two column use Paillier encryption, the last column no encryption. The first number is for the CCPP data set and the second one in parentheses for the CBM data set.

Data set			Training			
Name	Features	Samples	Encr. $\theta\&y$ grad. descent	Encr. $\theta\&y$ normal eq.	Encr. $\theta\&y$ preprocessing	Encr. $X\&y$ grad. descent
Auto-mpg	8	394	558	16,307	2,957	13,415
Forestfire	10	518	533	14,414	2,054	15,156
BCW	10	684	711	11,921	1,036	15,280
Concrete	14	1031	323	4,142	467	4,460
Red Wine	12	1600	678	9,767	935	9,533
White Wine	12	4899	386	5,118	361	2,549

Table 4: Average server overhead of training for 6 additional data sets (separate numbers for each proposed algorithm).

and samples in the data set.[5] It is thus worth investigating how varying the number of features and samples affects the performance of each algorithm. To this end, we generated random data sets with F features and S samples where $F \in \{10, 20, 40, 80\}$ and $S \in \{1000, 2000, 4000, \ldots, 32000\}$. As before, we are interested in the overhead for training and predicting. Ideally, the running times increase in a similar fashion when increasing the number of features or samples for both unencrypted and encrypted data. In other words, the server overhead remains constant regardless of the dimensions of the input. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the running time for the training phase and predictions when increasing the number of samples and features, respectively. The number of features is set to 10 in Figure 5, and 1000 samples are used in Figure 6.

4.4 Discussion

In comparison to training a model without encryption, the overhead factor is between 179 and 600 for gradient descent when y and θ are encrypted and between 2500 and 15000 when X and y are encrypted. Note that the overhead decreases with higher numbers of samples. When solving the normal equation, the overhead is roughly between 5000 and 17000 without preprocessing and drops to about 300 to 3000 with preprocessing. Thus, solving the normal equation is substantially faster for a small number of features than gradient descent. What is more, the overhead on the server can be lowered by an order of magnitude by imposing some work on the client for preprocessing or divisions.

The overhead for predictions is higher. However, these operations are typically performed on single samples rather than bulk data and therefore the absolute time per prediction is still fairly small and acceptable for practical use. More importantly, the communication cost is often several orders of magnitude larger than the cost of prediction, which implies that the end-to-end slow-down is negligible.

When y and θ are encrypted our algorithms complete training the model in less than 10 seconds on all datasets. For the use case where X and y are encrypted, the largest dataset requires 38 seconds for training. Predictions can be executed in the subsecond range. We conclude that the running times of our methods on both data sets are within a range acceptable for practical use.

Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ methods applying the normal equation directly with or without preprocessing exhibit the following benefits: (i) No interaction with the client is needed during the computation of the model. (ii) The results are very accurate and the user does not need to decide on parameters such as learning rate and number of iterations. This makes the process of choosing parameters easier—in the case of gradient descent, a wrong learning rate could result in the method not converging. On the contrary, the complexity and feasibility of all methods incorporating

[5] Note that the time for encryption per value is also more or less constant as we always use 30 bits to encode data values.

Data set			Prediction	
Name	Features	Samples	Encr. $\theta\&y$	Encr. $X\&y$
Auto-mpg	8	394	2,640	4,840
Forestfire	10	518	3,657	6,479
BCW	10	684	3,818	6,835
Concrete	14	1031	1,640	2,975
Red Wine	12	1600	3,465	6,120
White Wine	12	4899	3,427	6,327

Table 5: Average server overhead of prediction for 6 additional data sets (Encrypted $\theta\&\mathbf{y}$ and Encrypted $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$).



Figure 5: The running time for each algorithm to train the model in both considered scenarios is given for $1000, 2000, 4000, \ldots, 32,000$ samples. Each data set contains 10 features.



Figure 6: The running time for each algorithm to train the model and for computing predictions in both considered scenarios is given for $10, 20, 40, 80$ features. Each data set contains 1000 samples.

gradient descent strongly depends on the choice of parameters, particularly the learning rate α and the number of iterations K. If α is too large, the method does not converge. If it is too small, many iterations are required to achieve an acceptably small error $J(\theta)$. The number of iterations could be decreased by automatically tuning α between iterations based on the rate at which the error $J(\theta)$ is decreasing. This optimization would require sending additional encrypted values to the client in order to compute the error of the updated model. It depends on the data whether this overhead is less than the time saved by reducing the number of iterations. The gradient descent approaches perform particularly well on larger data sets, where the number of samples is in the order of ten thousand features.

When looking at the synthetic data sets (see Figure 5 and Figure 6) we can observe the behavior of our methods for a growing number of samples. In the plotted range all running times increase roughly linearly both with the number of samples and with the number of features (note that the x-axis of the plots is in log-scale). The number of features has a large impact on the running times, thus it is best to keep the number of features small, which can typically be achieved using techniques such as principal component analysis. We can further clearly see the difference between all the proposed algorithms with respect to running time. In particular, the scenario when X is in plaintext yields significantly smaller running times. Recall that optimizations are possible with iterative processing as described in §3.3.2.

Using a leveled or fully homomorphic encryption scheme would allow us to encrypt X, y, and θ. However, communication with the client would still be necessary for the gradient descent iteration steps because the known leveled and fully homomorphic encryption schemes do not support division. This limitation further entails that an approach based on the normal equation is hard to implement. If X, y, and θ must be encrypted, the multiplication of two ciphertext values is necessary for linear regression. Libraries such as HElib[6] offer this operation, yet the size of messages and keys and also the running time are large. For example, one could apply the method of Encrypted $\mathbf{X}\&\mathbf{y}$ with θ encrypted. In this case, the most costly operation per gradient descent iteration step is the multiplication of an encrypted n-by-n ma-

[6] See https://github.com/shaih/HElib.

trix with an encrypted vector of length n. Implementing this as proposed in [13], gives a lower bound of the running time per iteration of $25s$ for CBM and $8s$ for CCPP with HElib's default configuration for 32-bit plaintext integers. Thus, this method is at least 10,400 (178,000) times slower than plaintext operations for CCPP (CBM).

With a naive encoding of numbers (e.g., HElib's current encoding), around 9GB of encrypted data would need to be sent for the training task with CCPP. Different methods to compute the inverse of a matrix would need to be considered to decrease the communication cost. These results clearly show the substantial difference in performance when either X or θ is left in plaintext as opposed to encrypting X, y, and θ.

5 Related Work

Privacy-preserving techniques for outsourcing machine learning tasks received a lot of attention in a variety of scenarios. In this section, we discuss the most closely related approaches for regression. To the best of our knowledge, existing work employs either protocols with additional parties, e.g., two-server or multi-party-computation solutions under non-collusion assumptions [5, 7, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23], or protocols based on fully homomorphic encryption [11, 1].

Nikolaenko et al. consider the scenario where both the dependent and independent variables are confidential and the model is computed in plaintext [19]. They propose a two-server solution for ridge regression using the partially homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem [20] and garbled circuits [10, 26]. Under the assumption that the two servers do not collude, they provide methods for the parameter-free Cholesky decomposition to compute the pseudo inverse. On the same data sets and on data sets of similar dimensions, their approach can take 100-1000 times longer, despite the fact that they use shorter keys. Other solutions for the privacy-preserving computation with multiple servers include encryption schemes with trapdoors [21], multi-party-computation schemes or shared data [5, 7, 14, 16, 17, 22, 23].

Graepel et al. present an approach enabling the computation of machine learning functions as long as they can be expressed as or approximated by a polynomial of bounded degree with leveled homomorphic encryption [11], using the library HElib based on the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan scheme [3]. They focus on binary classification (linear means classification and Fisher's linear discriminant classifier). Moreover, they assume that it is known for two encrypted training examples whether they are labeled with the same classification (without revealing which one it is). In contrast, we apply simpler encryption methods that are several orders of magnitude faster on the data set BCW. Bost et al. consider privacy preserving classification (predictions but no training) [1]. They combine different encryption schemes into building blocks for the computation of comparisons, argmax, and the dot product. These building blocks require messages to be exchanged between the client and the server, which is not necessary in the computation of predictions with our algorithms.

6 Conclusion

We have proposed methods to train a regression model and use it for predictions in scenarios where part of the data and the model are confidential and must be encrypted. By exploiting the fact that not everything is encrypted, our methods work with partially homomorphic encryption and thereby achieve a significantly lower slow-down factor than state-of-the-art methods applicable to scenarios where everything must be encrypted. We have further presented an evaluation of our methods on two data sets and found the times needed to train a model and make predictions small enough for practical use. Our main contribution is hence addressing the problem in ways that enable the use of partially homomorphic encryption and a single server. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work for scenarios where independent variables can be public and the dependent variables and model must be encrypted. The trade-offs of the different methods we propose are of interest since they are suitable for different dataset properties.

In this paper, we have provided the details for linear regression only; however, it is important to note that our techniques can be extended to functions that can be approximated well by bounded-degree polynomials. To this end, models are trained with powers of the independent and dependent variables, where the polynomials can be evaluated homomorphically by multiplying the plaintext coefficients of the bounded-degree polynomials with powers of the sampled values and summing up the encrypted terms. While this approach incurs additional cost in terms of computation and communication, it allows our techniques to be applied to other problems, e.g., logistic regression or support vector machines. Implementing privacy-preserving equivalents of other algorithms based on our techniques and evaluating their applicability in practice is a valuable direction for future work.

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